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Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: GNS Partnership v. Fullmer 
Case No. 920763-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
This letter is sent pursuant to Rule 28 (j), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. In preparing for oral argument for the above-
referenced case, which is set for oral argument on Monday, March 
28, 1994, I discovered the following pertinent and significant 
authorities which I understand were not available in reporters when 
briefs were filed: 
United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bruaqeman, 505 N.W.2d 
87 (Minn. App. 1993); 
Community Credit Union v. Homelvig, 487 N.W.2d 602 
(N.D. 1992); and 
Dix Mutual Insurance v. La Framboise, 597 N.E.2d 622 
(111. 1992). 
These cases pertain to Point I beginning at page 9 in the 
Brief of Brad Fullmer. The cases are significant because they 
address one of the issues on appeal, whether a right of subrogation 
exists in favor of the landlord's insurer against a tenant. 
Very truly yours, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
KWM/da Keith W. Meade 
cc: Stuart Schultz 
Strong & Hanni 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
UNITED FIRE & CAS. CO. v. BRUGGEMAN Minn. 87 
Cite as 505 \ VV 2d 87 (Minn \pp 1993) 
UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY, Appellant, 
v. 
Jerry BRUGGEMAN and Carla Brugge-
man, d/b/a Junction Gifts and Craft 
Supply, Respondents, 
and 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
CO., Plaintiff, 
v. 
Jerry BRUGGEMAN and Carla Brugge-
man, d/b/a Junction Gifts and Craft 
Supply, Respondents. 
No. C3-93-333. 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota. 
Aug. 31, 1993. 
Review Denied Oct. 19, 1993. 
Landlords fire insurer brought subroga-
tion action against negligent tenants. The 
88 Minn. 505 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
District Court, Sherburne County, RobeH B. 
Danforth, J., entered judgment for tenants, 
and landlord appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Forsberg, J., held that tenants were 
coinsureds, for subrogation purposes. 
Affirmed. 
1. Insurance 0606(2.1) 
Negligent tenants were coinsureds un-
der landlord's fire policy, and, thus, were not 
amenable to subrogation suit. 
2. Insurance 0606(2.1) 
Tenants are coinsureds with landlord, 
for subrogation purposes; tenants and land-
lord have insurable interest in leased premis-
es, and since premium reflects increased risk 
of rental use and premium may be passed on 
to tenant in form of rent, this is most effi-
cient wray to allocate insurance costs. 
Syllabus by the Court 
Tenants are co-insureds under their 
landlord's fire insurance policy for purposes 
of subrogation actions. 
Gordon H. Hansmeier, Michael C. Rajkow-
ski, Donohue Rajkowski Ltd., St. Cloud, for 
appellant. 
Lee F. Haskell, Thomas F. Ascher, Cos-
grove, Flynn, Gaskins & O'Connor, Minne-
apolis, for respondents. 
Considered and decided by FORSBERG, 
P.J. and HUSPENI and SCHULTZ,* J J. 
OPINION 
FORSBERG, Judge. 
[1] A landlord's insurer brought a subro-
gation action against negligent tenants who 
caused fire damages. The trial court deter-
mined the tenants were co-insureds under 
the policy and therefore not amenable to suit. 
We affirm. 
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as 
judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by ap-
FACTS 
Respondents Jerry and Carla Bruggemal 
rented space from the Jedneak Brother] 
Properties in July 1990. There was no writ 
ten lease or contract between the parties 
and no independent arrangement for provj 
sion of insurance coverage was discussed 
On August 6, 1990, a fire destroyed the prog 
erty. The Jedneak Brothers were paid $81J 
275 by their insurer, appellant United Fire J 
Casualty Company (United). | 
United claimed the fire was negligently 
caused by the Bruggemans, and commence! 
this subrogation action. Trial was bifurcat* 
ed, with a jury determining negligence and 
damages, and the court determining the legal 
issue of whether a subrogation action may be 
maintained. The jury found the Brugge: 
mans were negligent and assigned damage? 
in the amount of $37,775. Despite these 
factual findings prerequisite to a subrogatio| 
action, the trial court denied recovery bj 
finding the Bruggemans were co-insured! 
under the fire policy. United's motion for | 
new trial was denied, and judgment was er^  
tered. United appeals, claiming the trial 
court erred in finding the Bruggemans were 
co-insureds. 1 
ISSUE j 
Did the trial court err in finding the ter£ 
ants co-insureds under their landlord's fir^ 
insurance policy, and therefore not amenable 
to a subrogation action? « 
i 
ANALYSIS ) 
[2] United claims the trial court erred in 
determining the Bruggemans were co-in-
sureds under its policy covering the Jedneai 
Brothers' property. This is a case of firsi 
impression in Minnesota, but the issue ha| 
been considered extensively by a number d 
other jurisdictions, where there is a cleai 
split in the holdings. We believe the greatel 
wisdom is in the majority position.
 t 
The first and leading case to state tfe 
majority position is Sutton v. Jondahl, 533 
P.2d 478 (Okla.App.1975). As in this case, 4 
i 
pomtment pursuant to Minn Const art. VI, § Ify 
UNITED FIRE & CAS. 
Cite as 505 N.VV.2d 87 
jury found a tenant had negligently caused a 
fire. Likewise, as here, there was no ex-
pressed agreement between landlord and 
tenant covering provision of fire insurance. 
The Sutton court determined subrogation 
was not available to the landlord's insurer. 
Id. at 482. 
The Sutton court recognized the landlord 
and the tenant were co-insureds because 
each had an insurable interest in the proper-
ty—the landlord a fee interest and the tenant 
a possessory interest. In Sutton, as here, 
the party with the fee interest purchased fire 
insurance, 
[alnd as a matter of sound business prac-
tice the premium paid had to be considered 
in establishing the rent rate on the rental 
unit. Such premium was chargeable 
against the rent as an overhead or operat-
ing expense. And of course it follows then 
that the tenant actually paid the premium 
as part of the monthly rental. 
Id. This sharing of proprietary interests and 
the expenses associated with protecting them 
gives rise to the co-insured relationship. 
We believe this is the most efficient way to 
allocate insurance costs. This is especially 
true when considering the reality of today's 
multi-unit rental market. If, as United con-
tends, each tenant is responsible for all dam-
ages arising from its negligence in causing a 
tire and if each tenant was therefore respon-
sible for its own fire insurance, the same 
property would be insured many times over. 
While this may provide insurance companies 
a welcome windfall, it would be contrary to 
economic logic and common sense. 
The minority position on the subject is well 
illustrated by the case of Neubauer v. Hos-
tetter, 485 N.W.2d 87 (Ia.1992). The Neu-
bauer court took a close look at the authority 
on this question and allowed the subrogation 
action because " it satisfies equitable con-
cerns by placing the burden of the loss where 
it ought to be—on the negligent party.' " Id. 
at 89 (quoting Fire Ins. Exch. v. Geekie, 179 
IU.App.3d 679, 128 Ill.Dec. 616, 617, 534 
N.E.2d 1061, 1062 (1989)). 
This minority position disregards the ma-
jority position's reasoning that a co-insured 
relationship is established because the tenant 
CO. v. BRUGGEMAN Minn. 89 
(Minn.App. 1993) 
indirectly pays the insurance premiums. 
When payment of rent is understood to in-
clude insurance premiums, as we believe it 
does, the minority position fails because in-
surance is purchased to hold the insured 
harmless from its negligence. The parties' 
status as co-insureds renders nugatory the 
issue of the relative negligence of the sepa-
rate interest holders. 
Also, we are not convinced by the minority 
position's concern that establishing the co-
insured relationship for purposes of subroga-
tion interferes with an insurer's ability to 
limit its risk. 
The insurer has a right to choose whom it 
will insure and it did not choose to insure 
the lessees, and under [Sutton ] the lessee 
could have sued the insurer for loss due to 
damage to the realty, e.g. loss of use if 
policy provides such coverage. Cases fol-
lowing Sutton, however, have at least im-
pliedly restricted the co-insurance relation-
ship to one limited solely to the purpose of 
prohibiting subrogation. 
Id., 485 N.W.2d at 89 (quoting 6A J. Apple-
man, Irisurance Law and Practice § 4055, at 
94 n. 86.01 (1991 Supp.)). 
The insurer knows the risk it is undertak-
ing when insuring a rental property. It in-
sures the building for the use for which it is 
intended. WTiile it may not have control 
over who the individual tenants are, it can 
increase its premiums to reflect increased 
risks presented by changing tenant use. 
Likewise, it can require the landlord to un-
dertake any number of safety and structural 
precautions. We believe the landlord is the 
party in the best position to assume such 
responsibilities, and we reject the minority 
position on this issue. 
Finally, we find no problem with limiting 
the co-insured relationship to the subrogation 
context. Landlord and tenant have separate 
insurable risks for loss of use in the event of 
a fire. The landlord's risk is directly related 
to the insured structure, that is, loss of rents. 
The tenant's loss of use involves the activity 
carried on within the structure. The tenant's 
loss arises from the use, not the structure. 
The shared insurable interests between land-
lord and tenant are limited to the structure, 
which is the subject of the fire policy. Risks 
90 Minn. 505 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
such as loss of use are therefore properly 
dealt mth in separate insurance contracts. 
United also claims several evidentiary er-
rors led to an insufficient award of damages. 
Since we affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
the subrogation action, we need not reach 
this issue. 
DECISION 
The Bruggemans were co-insureds under 
the Jedneak Brothers' fire insurance policy, 
and therefore are not subject to subrogation 
by United. The judgment of the tnal court 
is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
• § KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
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COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION OF NEW 
ROCKFORD, NORTH DAKOTA, Plain-
tiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Lynn HOMELVIG and Cindy Homeivig, 
husband and wife, Defendants and 
Appellees. 
Civ. No. 920001. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. 
July 28, 1992. 
Landlord's insurer, after paying land-
lord damages under fire policy for fire 
damage to leased house, brought subroga-, 
tion action against tenants in landlord's 
name, alleging that tenants negligently 
caused fire. The District Court, Eddy 
County, Gordon 0. Hoberg, J., entered 
summary judgment in favor of tenants, and 
appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, 
Erickstad, C.J., held that absent express 
agreement to the contrary, tenant is im-
plied coinsured under landlord's fire insur-
ance policy, and insurer may not seek sub-
rogation against tenant. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <&^ 178 
Purpose of summary judgment is to 
promote prompt and expeditious disposition 
of legal conflict on its merits, without trial, 
if no material dispute of fact exists or if 
only question of law is involved. 
further similar acts of misconduct that cause 
injury or potential injury to a client, the pub-
lic, the legal system, or the profession. 
6. NDPRLDD 4.5 addresses reinstatement of a 
lawyer after a short suspension: 
B. Short Suspension. A lawyer suspended 
for six months or less may resume practice at 
the end of the period of suspension by filing 
with the court and serving upon counsel an 
COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION v. HOMELVIG N. D. 603 
Cite as 487 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1992) 
2. Insurance <s=580(4), 606(1.1) 
Absent express agreement to the con-
trary, tenant is implied coinsured under 
landlord's fire insurance policy, and insurer 
may not seek subrogation against tenant. 
Michael J. Morley, of Morley & Morley, 
Ltd., Grand Forks, for plaintiff and appel-
lant. Argued by Robert M. Light. 
William P. Harrie (argued), of Nilles, 
Hansen & Davies, Ltd., Fargo, for defen-
dants and appellees. 
ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. 
The Community Credit Union of New 
Rockford appeals from a district court sum-
mary judgment dismissing its action 
against Lynn and Cindy Homelvig. We 
affirm. 
The Homelvigs leased a house from the 
Credit Union on a month-to-month basis 
with an option to purchase. The agree-
ment between the parties was oral; no 
written lease agreement was ever signed 
by the parties. The Credit Union insured 
the house with a policy issued by Cumis 
Insurance Society. The Homelvigs ob-
tained renters insurance, including liability 
coverage, from North Star Mutual Insur-
ance Company. 
^ On August 22, 1990, a fire destroyed the 
kitchen and caused smoke damage to the 
remainder of the house. Cumis paid $38,-
307 to the Credit Union for the damages. 
Cumis then brought this subrogation ac-
tion in the Credit Union's name, alleging 
that the Homelvigs negligently caused the 
fire. The Homelvigs moved for summary 
judgment, asserting that they were co-in-
sureds under the Cumis policy and that 
subrogation was barred as a matter of law. 
The district court concluded that the Ho-
melvigs were co-insureds under the Cumis 
policy and granted summary judgment. 
Cumis, through the Credit Union, appealed. 
[1] The purpose of summary judgment 
is to promote the prompt and expeditious 
disposition of a legal conflict on its merits, 
without trial, if no material dispute of fact 
pykts or if onlv a question of law is in-
volved. E.g., Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mutu-
al Insurance Co., Alb N.W.2d 136, 137 
(N.D. 1991); United Electric Service & 
Supply, Inc. v. Powers, 464 N.W.2d 818, 
819 (N.D.1991). The dispositive issue in 
this case is a question of law: whether a 
tenant is an implied co-insured on a land-
lord's fire insurance policy as a matter of 
law, absent an express agreement to the 
contrary. If the tenant is a co-insured 
under the policy, subrogation is unavail-
able. See Agra-By-Products, Inc. v. Ag-
way, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 142, 145 (N.D.1984); 
6A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 
§ 4055 (1972); 16 Couch, Insurance Law 
§ 61:137 (2d ed. 1983). 
The great majority of courts which have 
addressed this issue have held that, absent 
an express agreement to the contrary, a 
tenant is an implied co-insured under the 
landlord's fire policy and subrogation is 
barred. See, e.g., Tate v. Trialco Scrap, 
Inc., 745 F.Supp. 458 (M.D.Tenn.1989); 
Alaska Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaska 
Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216 
(Alaska 1981); Liberty Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Auto Spring Supply Co., 59 
Cal.App.3d 860, 131 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1976); 
Safeco Insurance Cos. v. Weisgerber, 115 
Idaho 428, 767 P.2d 271 (1989); New 
Hampshire Insurance Group v. Labom-
bard, 155 Mich.App. 369, 399 N.W.2d 527 
(1986); Safeco Insurance Co. v. Capri, 101 
Nev. 429, 705 P.2d 659 (1985); Sutton v. 
Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okl.Ct.App.1975); 
Fashion Place Investment, Ltd. v. Salt 
Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989); Cascade Trailer Court v. Beeson, 
50 Wash.App. 678, 749 P.2d 761 (1988). 
As noted by one leading commentator: 
"The modem trend of authority holds 
that the lessor's insurer cannot obtain 
subrogation against the lessee, in the 
absence of an express agreement or 
lease provision establishing the lessee's 
liability, because the lessee is considered 
a co-insured of the lessor for the purpose 
of preventing subrogation; the parties 
are co-insureds because of the reasonable 
expectations they derive from their privi-
ty under the lease, their insurable inter-
ests in the property, and the commercial 
realities under which lessors insure 
604 N. D. 487 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
leased premises and pass on the premium 
cost in rent and under which insurers 
make reimbursement for fires negligent-
ly caused by their insureds' negligence." 
6A Appleman, supra, § 4055, 1991 Supp. at 
79. Professor Keeton also advocates the 
majority rule: 
"The possibility that a lessor's insurer 
may proceed against a lessee almost cer-
tainly is not within the expectations of 
most landlords and tenants unless they 
have been forewarned by expert counsel-
ing. When lease provisions are either 
silent or ambiguous in this regard—and 
especially when a lessor's insurance poli-
cy is also silent or ambiguous—courts 
should adopt a rule against allowing the 
lessor's insurer to proceed against the 
tenant." 
Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law § 4.4(b) 
at 340-341 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
The seminal case setting forth the major-
ity rule is Sutton v. Jondahl, supra, in 
which the tenant's son had caused a fire 
damaging the insured premises. Conclud-
ing that the landlord's insurer could not 
seek subrogation against the tenant, the 
court reasoned: 
''Under the facts and circumstances in 
this record the subrogation should not be 
available to the insurance carrier because 
the law considers the tenant as a co-
insured of the landlord absent an express 
agreement between them to the contrary, 
comparable to the permissive-user fea-
ture of automobile insurance. This prin-
ciple is derived from a recognition of a 
relational reality, namely, that both land-
lord and tenant have an insurable inter-
est in the rented premises—the former 
owns the fee and the latter has a posses-
sory interest. Here the landlords (Sut-
tons) purchased the fire insurance from 
Central Mutual Insurance Company to 
protect such interests in the property 
against loss from fire. This is not un-
common. And as a matter of sound busi-
ness practice the premium paid had to be 
considered in establishing the rent rate 
on the rental unit. Such premium was 
chargeable against the rent as an over-
head or operating expense. And of 
course it follows then that the tenant 
actually paid the premium as part of the 
monthly rental. 
'The landlords of course could have 
held out for an agreement that the ten-
ant would furnish fire insurance on the 
premises. But they did not. They elect-
ed to themselves purchase the coverage. 
To suggest the fire insurance does not 
extend to the insurable interest of an 
occupying tenant is to ignore the realities 
of urban apartment and single-family 
dwelling renting. Prospective tenants 
ordinarily rely upon the owner of the 
dwelling to provide fire protection for the 
realty (as distinguished from personal 
property) absent an express agreement 
otherwise 
"Basic equity and fundamental justice 
upon which the equitable doctrine of sub-
rogation is established requires that 
when fire insurance is provided for a 
dwelling it protects the insurable inter-
ests of all joint owners including the 
possessory interests of a tenant absent 
an express agreement by the latter to 
the contrary. The company affording 
such coverage should not be allowed to 
shift a fire loss to an occupying tenant 
even if the latter negligently caused 
it . . . For to conclude otherwise is to 
shift the insurable risk assumed by the 
insurance company from it to the ten-
ant—a party occupying a substantially 
different position from that of a fire-
causing third party not in privity with 
the insured landlord." 
Sutton v. Jondahl, supra, 532 P.2d at 482. 
Other courts V^ve ex-p^ded the Suttou 
rationale, addressing various public policies 
which support the rule. For example, in 
Safeco Insurance Co. v. Capri, supra, 705 
P.2d at 661, the Supreme Court of Nevada 
stated: 
"It is not uncommon for the lessor to 
provide fire insurance on the leased prop; 
erty. As a matter of sound business 
practice, the premium to be paid had to 
be considered in establishing the rental 
rate. Also, such premiums would be 
chargeable against the rent as an over-
head or operating expense. Accordingly, 
the tenant actually paid the premium as 
DOMRES v. 
Cite as 487 N.W.2d 
part of the monthly rental. Sutton, su-
pra, 532 P.2d at 482. Courts therefore 
consider it to be an undue hardship to 
require a tenant to insure against his 
own negligence, when he is paying, 
through his rent, for the fire insurance 
which covers the premises 
"Moreover, insurance companies ex-
pect to pay their insureds for negligently 
caused fires and adjust their rates ac-
cordingly. In this context, an insurer 
should not be allowed to treat a tenant, 
who is in privity with the insured land-
lord, as a negligent third party when it 
could not collect against its own insured 
had the insured negligently caused the 
fire." 
See also New Hampshire Insurance 
Group v. Labombard, supra, 399 N.W.2d 
at 531. 
The court in Tate v. Trtalco Scrap, Inc., 
supra, 745 F.Supp. at 473, also emphasized 
that it is the tenant who ultimately bears 
the cost of the landlord's insurance premi-
ums: 
"The realities of who ultimately pays 
for the insurance also support adoption 
of this rule. Despite the fact that the 
lessor may actually send the premium 
check to the insurance company, the les-
see ultimately pays for insurance 
through his rent checks, because the les-
sor takes his own costs into account 
when setting rent. If the lessee is ulti-
mately the source of the insurance pay-
ment, simple equity would suggest that 
he be able to benefit from that payment 
unless he has clearly bargained away 
that benefit." 
Other policy arguments in favor of the 
majority rule include preventing windfalls 
to insurers and preventing multiple policies 
and overlapping coverage. See, e.g., Tate 
v. Trtalco Scrap, Inc., supra, 745 F.Supp. 
at 473; Safeco Insurance Cos. v. Weisger-
ber, supra, 767 P.2d at 274. 
[2] The cases adopting the majority 
rule are well-reasoned and highly per-
suasive. We hold that, absent an express 
agreement to the contrary, a tenant is an 
implied co-insured under the landlord's in-
BACKES N.D. 605 
605 (N.D. 1992) 
surance policy and the insurer may not 
seek subrogation against the tenant. 
The district court did not err in holding 
that the Homelvigs were implied co-in-
sureds under the Cumis policy. According-
ly, summary judgment was appropriate. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
VANDE WALLE, LEVINE, MESCHKE 
and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. 
( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
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149 I11.2d 314 
173 Ill.Dec. 648 
DIX MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
as Subrogee of Roy Mitchell Estate, 
Appellee, 
v. 
Terrence LaFRAMBOISE, Appellant. 
No. 72037. 
Supreme Court of Illinois. 
July 30, 1992. 
Insurer filed subrogation action 
against tenant to recover amount it paid to 
landlord for fire loss allegedly caused by 
tenant's negligence. The Circuit Court, 
Vermilion County, John P. O'Rourke, J., 
dismissed complaint, and insurer appealed. 
The Appellate Court, 213 Ill.App.3d 292, 
157 Ill.Dec.140, 571 N.E.2d 1159, reversed 
and remanded. Tenant petitioned for leave 
to appeal which was allowed. The Su-
preme Court, Bilandic, J., held that: (1) 
tenant could not be held liable for negli-
gently caused fire damage to leased prem-
ises solely on basis that lease did not con-
tain a provision expressly relieving tenant 
of such liability; (2) construing lease as a 
whole, parties intended that tenant was not 
to be liable for any fire damage to premises 
and that landlord would look solely to in-
surance as compensation for any fire dam-
age to the premises; and (3) by payment of 
rent, tenant gained status of coinsured un-
der policy, precluding subrogation action 
against tenant by insurer. 
Appellate Court reversed; Circuit 
Court affirmed. 
Freeman, J., concurred with opinion. 
Heiple, J., dissented with opinion. 
1. Pretrial Procedure ^679 
When legal sufficiency of a complaint 
is challenged by a motion to dismiss, all 
well-pleaded facts in the complaint are tak-
en as true. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=*863, 919 
On review of dismissal for failure to 
state a cause of action, Supreme Court 
must determine whether well-pleaded alle-
gations of the complaint, when interpreted 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, are 
sufficient to set forth a cause of action 
upon which relief may be granted. 
3. Subrogation <3=»1 
"Subrogation" is a {method whereby 
one who has involuntarily paid a debt or 
claim of another succeeds to the rights of 
the other with respect to the claim or debt 
so paid. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Subrogation <s=»l 
Right of subrogation is an equitable 
right and remedy which rests on principle 
that substantial justice should be attained 
by placing ultimate responsibility for a loss 
upon the one against whom in good con-
science it ought to fall. 
DIX MUT. INS. CO. v. LapRAMBOISE 111. 623 
Cite M 397 N.R2d 622 (III 1992) 
5. Subrogation <&»1 12. Insurance <fc=>606(l) 
Subrogation is allowed to prevent in- Insurer may not subrogate against its 
justice and unjust enrichment but will not own insured or any person or entity that 
be allowed where it would be inequitable to has a status of a coinsured under the poli-
do so. cy. 
6. Subrogation <s=>l 
There is no general rule to determine 
whether right of subrogation exists since 
right depends upon equities of each partic-
ular case. 
7. Subrogation <3=>32 
One who asserts a right of subrogation 
must step into the shoes of, or be substitut-
ed for, the one whose claim or debt he has 
paid and can only enforce those rights 
which the latter could enforce. 
8. Landlord and Tenant <S=>55(1) 
Although a tenant is generally liable 
for fire damage caused to leased premises 
by his negligence, if the parties intended to 
exculpate the tenant from negligently 
caused fire damage, their intent witi be 
enforced. 
9. Landlord and Tenant <s=>37 
Lease between landlord and tenant 
must be interpreted as a whole so as to 
give effect to intent of the parties. 
10. Landlord and Tenant @=*55(1) 
Tenant could not be held liable for 
negligently caused fire damage to leased 
premises solely on basis that lease did not 
contain a provision expressly relieving ten-
ant of such liability. 
11. Landlord and Tenant <&=»55(1) 
Construing lease as a whole, parties 
intended that tenant was not to be liable 
for any fire damage to premises and that 
landlord would look solely to insurance as 
compensation for any fire damage to prem-
ises; parties considered possibility of fire 
and expressly provided that landlord would 
not be responsible for fire damage to ten-
ant's personal property, indicating that par-
ties intended for each to be responsible for 
his own property; conclusion was sup-
ported by landlord's conduct in taking out 
fire policy to cover leased premises. 
13. Insurance <^606(1.1) 
Under provisions of lease as a whole, 
reasonable expectations of the parties, and 
principles of equity and good conscience, 
fire insurer under policy issued to landlord 
could not maintain subrogation action 
against tenant for fire loss due to tenant's 
negligence; by payment of rent, tenant 
contributed to payment of insurance premi-
um, thereby gaining status of coinsured 
under policy; moreover, landlord intended 
that policy would cover any fire damage to 
premises no matter who caused it, and to 
conclude otherwise would have defeated 
reasonable expectations of the parties. 
John A. Beyer and Steven D. Ziegler, 
Satter, Beyer & Spires, Pontiac, for appel-
lant. 
Monica E. Rackauskas, Mark E. Condon 
and Peter W. Schoonmaker, Condon & 
Cook, Chicago, for appellee. 
Justice BILANDIC delivered the opinion 
of the court: 
Dix Mutual Insurance Company (insur-
ance company) paid its insured (landlord) 
$40,579 for a fire loss on certain real prop-
erty. The insurance company, by way of 
subrogation, seeks to recover the $40,579 
from Terrence LaFramboise (tenant) be-
cause he allegedl^caused the fire loss due 
to his negligence. The trial court dis-
missed the insurance company's first-
amended complaint for failure to state a 
cause of action. The trial court found that 
the parties did not intend for the tenant to 
be liable for fire damage to the real proper-
ty and that the tenant was a co-insured 
under the insurance company's insurance 
policy. The appellate court reversed, rein-
stated the first-amended complaint and re-
manded the cause for further proceedings, 
213 Ill.App.3d 292, 157 Ill.Dec. 140, 571 
N.E.2d 1159. We allowed the tenant's peti-
tion for leave to appeal, 141 I11.2d 538, 162 
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Ill.Dec. 485, 580 N.E.2d 111. (134 I11.2d R. 
315.) We reverse. 
The unique facts of this case compel us 
to include the entire lease, which, in words 
and figures, is as follows: 
"LEASE AGREEMENT 
This Lease is made between Terry 
LaFramboise, tenant and acting landlord, 
J.S. Ludwig. 
The house is leased beginning Septem-
ber 15, 1986 through September 15, 1987 
for $325.00 per month. This amount is 
payable on the 15 [sic] of the month. 
TERMS: 
(A) $325.00 deposit has been made and 
will be considered the last month's rent 
of the year. 
(B) The Tenant is to furnish their [sic ] 
own utilities. 
(C) The Tenant is to mow and keep the 
yard and area around the house neat at 
all times and the farm buildings. 
(D) The Tenant will not xxxxxxxxxxxx 
[sic] in walls, paint, or make any addi-
tions to the home that are permanent 
without approval of the Landlord. 
(E) The Tenant will assume their [sic ] 
own risk for their [sic ] personal property 
and Landlord, J.S. Ludwig, will not be 
responsible for fire, wind, or water dam-
age. 
DESCRIPTION: 
The house is located on the Mitchell 
Farm in Vermilion County, Pilot town-
ship. 
TENANT: LANDLORD: 
s/ Terry LaFramboise s/ JJ^ Ludwig 
Date: 9-16-86 Date: 9-15-86" 
During the term of the lease, the landlord 
maintained fire insurance coverage on the 
real property from the insurance company. 
During the one-year term, the tenant, 
with the landlord's approval, attempted to 
strip the paint from the exterior of the 
property with a power stripper, which re-
moves paint by heat application. During 
this process, the house was damaged by 
fire. The landlord filed a claim with the 
insurance company and was paid $40,579 
for the loss. The insurance company then 
brought this subrogation action against the 
tenant to recover the amount it paid to the 
landlord for the fire loss. In its complaint, 
the insurance company alleged that the ten-
ant was negligent in his use of the power 
stripper. The issue before this court is 
whether the insurance company's first-
amended complaint states a cause of action 
in subrogation. 
[1,2] When the legal sufficiency of a 
complaint is challenged by a motion to dis-
miss, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint 
are to be taken as true. (Burdinie v. 
Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 
I11.2d 501, 505, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d 
654.) On review, we must determine 
whether the well-pleaded allegations of the 
complaint, when interpreted in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, are suffi-
cient to set forth a cause of action upon 
which relief may be granted. Burdinie, 
139 I11.2d 501, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d 
654. 
[3-6] The doctrine of subrogation is a 
creature of chancery. It is a method 
whereby one who has involuntarily paid a 
debt or claim of another succeeds to the 
rights of the other with respect to the claim 
or debt so paid. (34 Ill.L. & Prac. Subroga-
tion § 2 (1958).) The right of subrogation 
is an equitable right and remedy which 
rests on the principle that substantial jus-
tice should be attained by placing ultimate 
responsibility for the loss upon the one 
against whom in good conscience it ought 
to fall. (34 Ill.L. & Prac. Subrogation § 2 
(1958).) Subrogation is allowed to prevent 
injustice and unjust enrichmenttbut will not 
be allowed where it would be inequitable to 
do so. (34 Ill.L. & Prac. Subrogation § 6 
(1958).) There is no general rule which can 
be laid down to determine whether a right 
of subrogation exists since this right de-
pends upon the equities of each particular 
case. See 34 Ill.L. & Prac. Subrogation 
§ 6 (1958). 
[7] One who asserts a right of subroga-
tion must step into the shoes of, or be 
substituted for, the one whose claim or 
debt he has paid and can only enforce those 
rights which the latter could enforce. 
(Continental Casualty Co, v. Polk Broth-
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ers, Inc. (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 395, 397, 75 
Ill.Dec. 712, 457 N.E.2d 1271.) Conse-
quently, in the case at bar, the insurance 
company may assert a right of subrogation 
against the tenant for the fire damage if: 
(1) the landlord could maintain a cause of 
action against the tenant and (2) it would 
be equitable to allow the insurance compa-
ny to enforce a right of subrogation 
against the tenant. 
[8,9] With these principles in mind, we 
turn to the case at bar. Although a tenant 
is generally liable for fire damage caused 
to the leased premises by his negligence, if 
the parties intended to exculpate the tenant 
from negligently caused fire damage, their 
intent will be enforced. {One Hundred 
South Wacker Drive, Inc. v. Szabo Food 
Service, Inc. (1975), 60 I11.2d 312, 326 
N.E.2d 400; Stein v. Yarnall-Todd Chev-
rolet, Inc. (1968), 41 I11.2d 32, 241 N.E.2d 
439; Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co. 
(1955), 7 I11.2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100.) The 
lease between the landlord and the tenant 
must be interpreted as a whole so as to 
give effect to the intent of the parties. 
Stein, 41 I11.2d at 35, 241 N.E.2d 439. 
[10] In the instant case, the insurance 
company contends that the tenant is liable 
for negligently caused fire damage because 
the lease does not contain a provision ex-
pressly relieving the tenant of this liability. 
This argument, however, is without merit. 
In Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 396, 131 
N.E.2d 100, this court stated: 
"[B]ecause the contingency was not cov-
ered by express language, it does not 
follow that the instrument may not, 
when all of its provisions are con-
sidered, show that the parties them-
selves intended that the lessee should 
not be liable. That determination is to 
be made upon a consideration of the in-
strument as a whole." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
Accordingly, to ascertain the intent of the 
parties, we must consider the lease "as a 
whole." 
[11] Although the appellate court prop-
erly determined that Cerny-Pickas con-
trols the instant case, it nevertheless failed 
to actually construe the lease "as a whole." 
Instead, the appellate court concluded that 
the absence of a "yield-back" provision re-
vealed the parties' intent to place responsi-
bility for negligently caused fire damage 
on the tenant. The appellate court deter-
mined that the tenant could only be re-
lieved of this responsibility by an express 
provision in the lease. This, however, is 
not the law in Illinois. In Illinois, courts 
must look to the lease "as a whole" and the 
spirit of the agreement between the parties 
rather than search for an express provision 
in the lease. (See One Hundred South 
Wacker Drive, Inc. v. Szabo Food Service, 
Inc. (1975), 60 I11.2d 312, 314, 326 N.E.2d 
400; Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 396, 131 
N.E.2d 100.) In the instant case, even the 
most cursory examination of the lease "as 
a whole" leads us to the obvious conclusion 
that neither the landlord nor the tenant 
was a sophisticated real estate mogul. It 
is hardly surprising to us that this particu-
lar lease does not contain a "yield-back" 
clause, as it is quite likely that the parties 
involved did not even know what a "yield-
back" clause is. 
The lease "as a whole" indicated that the 
tenant wanted shelter for one year for 
which he promised to pay a modest rent, 
furnish his own utilities, perform certain 
services on the farm, and assume the risk 
for his own personal property. The land-
lord agreed. Although one may be critical 
of the grammar, punctuation or even the 
style of the lease, it is difficult to find fault 
with the spirit of the document. In draft-
ing this document, the landlord expressly 
placed minor duties on the tenant. "As a 
whole," the lease does not reflect any in-
tent that, during the course of the one-year 
term, the tenant would be responsible for 
any fire damage to the realty and be re-
quired to pay an additional $40,579 to the 
landlord. Such a proposition would 
bly be beyond the wildest dreams 
parties. 
The only paragraph which purportedly 
addresses the risks borne by either party is 
paragraph (E) which reads: 
"(E) The Tenant will assume their 
[sic] own risk for their [sic] personal 
property and Landlord, J.S. Ludwig, will 
j] 
» to the I 
I proba- J 
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not be responsible for fire, wind or water 
damage.'' 
The insurance company contends that the 
last clause in this paragraph reveals the 
parties' intent to place responsibility for 
fire damage to the real property on the 
tenant. This argument persuaded the ap-
pellate court. However, the appellate 
court improperly read the last clause in 
isolation from the beginning part of the 
sentence. When read as one complete sen-
tence, it is obvious to us that the parties 
intended to expressly place responsibility 
for his own personal property on the tenant 
and to exempt the landlord from liability 
for damage to the tenant's personal prop-
erty. See, e.g., Tondre v. Pontiac School 
District No. 105 (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 838, 
843, 342 N.E.2d 290 (qualifying phrase is 
confined to the last antecedent). 
We find it significant that the parties, 
who obviously considered the possibility of 
fire, expressly provided for the tenant's 
personal property but failed to do so with 
respect to the leased premises. This fact 
indicates to us that the parties intended for 
each to be responsible for his own proper-
ty. This conclusion is supported by the 
landlord's conduct in taking out a fire in-
surance policy to cover the leased premises. 
As this court has noted before: 
" Tire insurers expect to pay fire losses 
for negligent fires and their rates are 
calculated upon that basis; indeed, we 
may well assume that a great majority of 
fires are caused by someone's negligence 
in a greater or lesser degree.' [Cita-
tions.]" Stein, 41 I11.2d at 38, 241 
N.E.2d 439. 
Under the insurance company's argu-
ment: 
"it would be necessary for both parties 
to the lease to carry fire insurance if 
they are to be protected. The lessee 
would have to insure against fires due to 
his negligence, and the lessor against 
fires due to other causes. * * * The 
parties contemplated that the risk of loss 
by fire should be insured against and we 
see no reason to suppose that they did 
not contemplate the customary insurance 
policy which covers both accidental and 
negligent fires." (Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d 
at 398, 131 N.E.2d 100.) 
Therefore, we conclude that the parties in-
tended that the tenant was not to be liable 
for any fire damage to the premises and 
that the landlord would look solely to the 
insurance as compensation for any fire 
damage to the premises. 
In Cerny-Pickas, this court also noted: 
" The ancient law has been acquiesced 
in, and consciously or unconsciously, the 
cost of insurance to the landlord, or the 
value of the risk enters into the amount 
of rent.' * * * 'They necessarily con-
sciously figured on the rentals to be paid 
by the tenant as the source of the fire 
insurance premiums and intended that 
the cost of insurance was to come from 
the tenants. In practical effect the ten-
ant paid the cost of the fire insurance.' " 
Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 398, 131 N.E.2d 
100. 
[12,13] It is well settled that an insurer 
may not subrogate against its own insured 
or any person or entity who has the status 
of a co-insured under the insurance policy. 
{Reich v. Tharp (1987), 167 Ill.App.3d 496, 
501, 118 IlLDec. 248, 521 N.E.2d 530; 16 
Couch on Insurance § 61:137, at 197 (rev. 
1983).) Under the particular facts of this 
case, the tenant, by payment of rent, has 
contributed to the payment of the insur-
ance premium, thereby gaining the status 
of co-insured under the insurance policy. 
Both the landlord and tenant intended that 
the policy would cover any fire damage to 
the premises no matter who caused it, and 
to conclude otherwise would defeat the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties. 
We therefore conclude that, under the 
provisions of the lease as a whole, the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, and 
the principles of equity and good con-
science, the insurance company cannot 
maintain a subrogation action against the 
tenant under the facts of this case. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse 
the appellate court and affirm the trial 
court's dismissal of the insurance compa-
ny's first-amended complaint. 
Appellate court reversed; circuit court 
affirmed. 
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Justice FREEMAN, concurring: 
I concur with that portion of the majority 
opinion which holds that the parties intend-
ed that the tenant be exonerated from lia-
bility for any fire damage to the premises 
and that the landlord might look solely to 
the insurance as compensation for any fire 
damage to the premises. I write only to 
express my disagreement with the majority 
holding that under these facts the tenant 
attained "the status of a co-insured under 
the insurance policy" by the payment of 
rent. 149 I11.2d at 323, 173 Ill.Dec. at 652, 
597 N.E.2d at 626. 
Firstly, the result obtained by the majori-
ty opinion, i.e., that the insurance compa-
ny's subrogation action is not maintainable, 
does not require that we reach the issue of 
whether the tenant was a co-insured under 
the landlord's policy. In Cerny-Pickas & 
Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co. (1955), 7 I11.2d 393, 
131 N.E.2d 100, this court held that a land-
lord's insurer's subrogation action was not 
maintainable against a tenant, without ad-
ditionally concluding that the tenant was a 
co-insured under the landlord's insurance 
policy. Cerny-Pickas determined that 
such an action was not maintainable based 
simply on an examination of the parties' 
lease, which indicated that the tenant was 
to be exonerated from liability for fire loss, 
and certain "better reasoned decisions," 
which supported that result. {Cerny-Pic-
kas, 7 I11.2d at 398, 131 N.E.2d 100.) These 
"better reasoned decisions" did not express 
the view that tenants gain the status of co-
insureds by the payment of rent, but sim-
ply noted that tenants, thereby, bear the 
cost of insurance with their landlords. 
(See Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 398, 131 
N.E.2d 100.) In the instant case, as in 
Cerny-Pickas, the majority need only have 
looked to the parties' intent, as expressed 
by their lease, as well as basic subrogation 
principles, to conclude that the subrogation 
action was not maintainable. 
Secondly, but more importantly, the ma-
jority's holding on this point sweeps too 
broadly, serving to eviscerate the common 
law principle that a tenant is responsible 
for damage to leased premises resulting 
from his own negligence. (See 49 Am. 
Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant §§ 934, 935 
(1970); Annot, 10 A.L.R.2d 1012, 1016 et 
seq. (1950); Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d 393, 131 
N.E.2d 100; Fire Insurance Exchange v. 
Geekie (1989), 179 Ill.App.3d 679, 128 111. 
Dec. 616, 534 N.E.2d 1061.) Indeed, the 
majority's holding, while stated to be limit-
ed to "the particular facts of this case" 
(149 I11.2d at 323, 173 Ill.Dec, at 652, 597 
N.E.2d at 626), serves to elevate the status 
of every tenant to that of a co-insured 
under his or her landlord's insurance poli-
cy, unless expressly indicated otherwise. 
By logical extension, the tenant might then 
also be considered a co-insured of the land-
lord with respect to personal property or 
negligence liability on the premises. 
It is recognized that a tenant may attain 
the status of a co-insured where the in-
sured landlord covenants to carry insur-
ance for the benefit of the tenant. (See 16 
Couch on Insurance § 61:137 (rev. 1983).) 
Accordingly, our appellate court has ap-
proached the issue by looking at the ex-
press or implied terms of a lease, as well as 
surrounding extrinsic evidence, to discern 
the parties' agreement concerning the allo-
cation of insurance burdens. (Compare 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Polk Broth-
ers, Inc. (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 395, 75 111. 
Dec. 712, 457 N.E.2d 1271 (terms of lease 
and extrinsic evidence revealed that parties 
intended that landlord, rather than tenant, 
obtain real property insurance, resulting in 
nonviability of subrogation action); and 
Reich v. Tharp (1987), 167 Ill.App.3d 496, 
118 Ill.Dec. 248, 521 N.E.2d 530 (express 
terms of sale agreentent provided that both 
parties were to be named insureds on insur-
ance policy, with the result that party omit-
ted from policy deemed a co-insured); with 
Fire Insurance Exchange, 179 Ill.App.3d 
679, 128 Ill.Dec. 616, 534 N.E.2d 1061 (no 
term in lease concerning obligation to in-
sure premises; hence, tenant not a co-in-
sured).) This approach is not to say, how-
ever, that in all instances where a landlord 
has insurance and a tenant pays rent, the 
tenant becomes a co-insured. The better 
reasoned view, rather, requires that we 
base our decision not on the mere existence 
of insurance, but on the parties' agreement 
as to the allocation of that burden. 
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Notably, Anderson v. Peters (1986), 142 
Ill.App.3d 182, 96 Ill.Dec. 489, 491 N.E.2d 
768, a decision holding that a tenant is 
considered a co-insured, despite the ab-
sence of any indication of the parties' in-
tent, was expressly overruled by Fire In-
surance Exchange, 179 Ill.App.3d 679, 128 
Ill.Dec. 616, 534 N.E.2d 1061. The majori-
ty opinion returns us, sub silentio, to 
Anderson. 
Justice HEIPLE, dissenting: 
This case involves an insurance company 
which paid the insured landlord for fire loss 
to rental property. The insurance compa-
ny, by way of subrogation, now seeks to 
recover from the tenant for his negligence 
in causing the fire. The trial court, in 
dismissing the insurance company's com-
plaint, determined that the landlord and 
tenant did not intend for the tenant to be 
liable for fire damage, ruling that the ten-
ant was a co-insured with the landlord. 
The appellate court reversed and reinstated 
the complaint The majority of this court 
reverses the appellate court and affirms 
the trial court. 
This case presents the question of wheth-
er a tenant is absolved from liability for his 
negligence in burning down the landlord's 
premises. The majority holds that the ten-
ant is absolved. The effect of this unfortu-
nate decision is to make all tenants at any 
time and at any place co-insureds with their 
landlords. The only exception would be if 
the parties had a clear agreement to the 
contrary. 
I have two objections to the majority 
opinion. The first objection is that the 
opinion makes factual findings which are, 
simply put, not correct. My second objec-
tion is that the new rule of law which it 
announces is bad public policy. 
The majority opinion purports to find 
that the lease instrument, when read as a 
whole, contemplates that the tenant is a co-
insured on the landlord's fire policy. A 
reading of the lease discloses that this is 
not the case. Whether read in its individu-
al particulars or as a whole, the lease is 
utterly silent in this regard. As the lease 
is set out in full in the majority opinion, it 
is not necessary to repeat it here. An 
examination of the lease, however, dis-
closes that nothing in it gives any indica-
tion that the parties intended to absolve the 
tenant for his own negligent conduct or 
that the tenant was regarded as a co-in-
sured with the landlord. The only exculpa-
tory language of any kind is in favor of the 
landlord which provides in paragraph (E) 
that the tenant assumes the risk for his 
own personal property and that the land-
lord is not responsible for fire, wind or 
water damage. 
In arriving at its finding, the majority 
points out that "neither the landlord nor 
the tenant was a sophisticated real estate 
mogul." (149 I11.2d at 321, 173 Ill.Dec. at 
651, 597 N.E.2d at 625.) One may reason-
ably ask, If the parties had been sophisti-
cated real estate moguls, would the result 
in this case be different? Would it matter 
if one were a greater mogul and the other 
a lesser mogul? Is this a useful concept? 
The majority concludes, "Under the par-
ticular facts of this case, the tenant, by 
payment of rent, had contributed to the 
payment of the insurance premium, there-
by gaining the status of co-insured under 
the insurance policy." Sad to say, there 
are no facts in this case, either particular 
or general, that would cause one to con-
clude that the tenant contributed to the 
payment of the insurance premium or ex-
pected to be treated as a co-insured. That 
assumption is as gratuitous as saying that 
the payment of rent included maid service 
and clean linens. 
It is also worth noting that fire insurance 
is, generically speaking, casualty insur-
ance. Since the landlord owris the building, 
he is the person at risk if the building 
burns down from whatever cause, be it 
lightning, faulty wiring, a bad furnace, or 
the negligent conduct of any person. Con-
ceptually, liability insurance is different 
than casualty insurance. Liability insur-
ance covers a person for his own negligent 
conduct. Regarding liability, the lease in 
this case clearly exculpated the landlord for 
liability for damage caused to the tenant's 
personal property. No similar language 
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exculpated the tenant for negligently dam-
aging the landlord's premises. 
The fire insurance contract contemplated 
that the insurance company, by way of 
subrogation, could recover the loss paid 
from any responsible party other than the 
insured. In other words, the insurance 
company in that regard would occupy the 
same position as the insured himself. 
There is nothing in law to require an in-
sured to look either first or only to his 
insurance carrier for recovery of loss 
caused by another's negligence. The land-
lord, in this case, could have sued the ten-
ant directly. There is also nothing in law 
to require a landlord to carry fire insurance 
at all. How can it be said that a tenant is 
deemed to be a co-insured in a lease when 
the lease does not even mention or contem-
plate insurance? Suppose that the landlord 
in this case had not taken out an insurance 
policy. Would the majority say he was 
debarred from suing his tenant for negli-
gently burning down the premises? That 
is to say, would the loss be shifted away 
from the negligent tenant and onto the 
guiltless landlord? 
Other jurisdictions have also addressed 
the issue of when a tenant will be relieved 
from liability for negligently causing a fire 
in leased premises. The decisions from 
various jurisdictions can be divided into 
three categories: (1) absent an express 
agreement to the contrary the tenant is 
treated as a co-insured of the landlord and 
is not liable for negligently causing a fire; 
(2) absent an express agreement to the 
contrary the tenant is liable for negligently 
causing a fire; and (3) an express agree-
ment is not required and the determination 
of whether to hold the tenant liable for 
negligently causing a fire must be ascer-
tained from the lease as a whole. 
The lead case which determined that a 
tenant should be treated as a co-insured, 
absent an express agreement to the con-
trary, is Sutton v. Jondahl 
(Okla.App.1975), 532 P.2d 478. The rea-
sons expressed for reaching this conclusion 
were that: (1) an insurance policy protects 
all property interest and both the tenant 
and landlord have insurable interests in the 
premises; (2) in reality the tenant pays for 
part of the insurance premium through the 
payment of rent; (3) the reasonable expec-
tations of tenants is for the landlord to 
provide fire insurance which will cover 
them; and (4) equity calls for placing the 
risk of fire loss" upon the insurer which has 
collected premiums for the risk, rather 
than upon the tenant, which is a party in 
privity with the landlord. Sutton, 532 P.2d 
at 482. 
Several jurisdictions have followed Sut-
ton. Alaska Insurance Co. v. RCA Alas-
ka Communications, Inc. (Alaska 1981), 
623 P.2d 1216; Safeco Insurance Co. v. 
Weisgerber (1989), 115 Idaho 428, 767 P.2d 
271; Reeder v. Reeder (1984), 217 Neb. 120, 
348 N.W.2d 832; Safeco Insurance Co. v. 
Capri (1985), 101 Nev. 429, 705 P.2d 659; 
Monterey Corp. v. Hart (1976), 216 Va. 
843, 224 S.E.2d 142; Liberty Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Auto Spring Supply Co. 
(1976), 59 Cal.App.3d 860, 131 Cal.Rptr. 
211; New Hampshire Insurance Group v. 
Labombard (1986), 155 Mich.App. 369, 399 
N.W.2d 527; Fashion Place Investment, 
Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake 
County Mental Health (Utah App.1989), 
776 P.2d 941; Cascade Trailer Court v. 
Beeson (1988), 50 Wash.App. 678, 749 P.2d 
761. 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Brit-
ton v. Wooten (Ky.1991), 817 S.W.2d 443, 
recently addressed whether a tenant will be 
held liable for negligently causing a fire. 
In Britton, the court held that in order for 
a tenant to be exonerated from liability for 
negligently causing.a fire, the lease must 
contain a clear and'unequivocal expression 
stating such intent. In reaching this con-
clusion the Britton court noted that public 
policy disapproves of exculpatory agree-
ments in derogation of tort liability and 
such an agreement should be found only if 
it is explicit. Similar conclusions were also 
reached in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poling 
(1957), 248 Iowa 582, 81 N.W.2d 462; 
Winkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co. 
(1953), 238 N.C. 589, 79 S.E.2d 185; Zoppi 
v. Traurig (1990), 251 NJ.Super. 283, 598 
A.2d 19; and Galante v. Hathaway Baker-
ies, Inc. (1958), 6 A.D.2d 142, 176 N.Y.S.2d 
87. But cf Fireman's Insurance Co. v. 
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Wheeler (1991), 165 A.D.2d 141, 566 
N.Y.S.2d 692. 
Falling between these two views are the 
jurisdictions which do not require an ex-
press agreement to be in the lease. These 
jurisdictions determine whether or not a 
tenant is liable for his own negligence in 
causing a fire based upon the intent of the 
parties as evidenced from a reading of the 
lease as a whole. If the intent of the 
parties is unable to be ascertained, the 
common law rule placing liability upon the 
tenant for his negligent conduct is en-
forced. This court, prior to today's deci-
sion, clearly fell within this classification. 
(Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co. 
(1955), 7 I11.2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100.) Other 
jurisdictions which have endorsed this view 
include Neubauer v. Hostetter (Iowa 1992), 
485 N.W.2d 87; Acquisto v. Hahn Enter-
prises, Inc. (1980), 95 N.M. 193, 619 P.2d 
1237; Page v. Scott (1978), 263 Ark. 684, 
567 S.W.2d 101; and Rock Springs Realty, 
Inc. v. Waid (Mo.1965), 392 S.W.2d 270. 
In general, I believe that the public is 
better served if negligent actors are held 
responsible for the damage or injury they 
cause. While I would agree that parties to 
a lease may agree to exculpate a tenant for 
negligent conduct which damages the 
premises and that a lease may be drawn so 
as to regard the tenant as a co-insured, I 
cannot agree that the lease in this case 
contemplated any such thing. Further, I 
cannot agree that the mere payment of 
rent in the absence of other language 
should operate to exculpate a tenant who 
negligently causes damage to the premises. 
For the reasons given, I respectfully dis-
sent. 
